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I. Introduction
There has been a great deal of controversy recently concerning compensation paid 
by some of the largest corporations in the United States to their principal officers.  For 
instance, The New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, filed suit on May 24, 2004 
against The New York Stock Exchange, its former Chairman, Dick Grasso, and the 
former Chairman of the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors, for the 
recovery of over $100,000,000 paid to Mr. Grasso as compensation.2  The suit contends 
that the compensation paid to Mr. Grasso was unreasonable and the product of 
manipulation and intimidation.3  In a statement, Attorney General Spitzer says that the 
board of directors lacked proper information, stifled internal debate and failed to conduct 
a proper inquiry in its deliberations concerning the matter.4  Another recent article states 
that the board of directors of Cendant Corporation revised the employment contract of 
Henry Silverman, its CEO, in order to settle a derivative action filed in the Delaware 
Chancery Court alleging excessive compensation.5  Reportedly, Mr. Silverman received 
executive pay of $60,100,000 in 2003, including a $13,800,000 bonus and $4,600,000 
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2paid in premiums on life insurance.6  These are just two of many recent examples of 
public reports of allegations of excessive executive compensation.  The question naturally 
arises as to the legal right of stockholders to challenge what they perceive to be 
unreasonable or excessive compensation.
The payment of unreasonable or excessive compensation by public corporations 
may be challenged on two distinct bases.7  One basis involves a challenge based upon the 
doctrine of waste.  The other basis involves a claim that the board of directors has 
breached its duty to act in good faith and with due care.  The latter claim may be 
defended based upon the so-called business judgment rule.  That rule protects the 
directors’ decisions, without regard to their reasonableness, where the directors have been 
informed of all reasonably available material information concerning the subject matter 
to be decided and have acted in good faith in a manner that the directors believe to be in 
the best interest of the corporation.  Essentially the rule provides that the quality of the 
decision is not determinative of liability, only the process utilized in reaching the decision 
is important.  This article will focus solely upon the applicability of the doctrine of waste 
and leave to others a discussion of the business judgment rule. 
The doctrine of waste has a well-established precedent in the law with respect to 
payment of compensation by corporations, as described nearly 72 years ago in the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Rogers v. Hill.8  However, the 
continued viability of the doctrine is at issue, at least in the state of Delaware, in view of 
6 Id.
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3the Delaware Supreme Court decision in Brehm v. Eisner.9 The decision in Brehm v. 
Eisner is important because Delaware is the leading jurisdiction for articulating principles 
of law applicable to corporations.  
This article contains a review of the early precedents involving public 
corporations wherein the doctrine of waste was established and applied, and more recent 
decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court that have addressed the doctrine of waste.  It 
identifies apparent deficiencies in the understanding and application of the historic 
doctrine of waste by the Delaware Supreme Court.  Indeed, if the principles enunciated 
by the Delaware Supreme Court are followed, the doctrine of waste will have been 
effectively revoked, while the court does not appear to have recognized this consequence 
of its decisions.  Hopefully, this article will provide some much needed clarity to this area 
of the law.
II. The Early Development of the Doctrine of Waste.
The payment of substantial compensation to executive management of 
corporations in the United States first came about after World War I.10 By 1928, 
executives of some of the largest corporations received compensation as high as 
$1,500,000 annually.11  Following the depression years of 1929-1930, compensation fell 
dramatically but again turned up in the years immediately thereafter.12  These events 
resulted in a flurry of litigation as to the reasonableness of compensation at some of these 
major corporations.13  These events also caused the United States Congress to direct the 
Federal Trade Commission to investigate corporate salaries paid during the years 
9 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
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4preceding the depression and to publish much of the resulting information.14  Due to 
Congress' concern about perceived excessive executive compensation, it passed 
legislation requiring public corporations to provide their shareholders with information 
about compensation paid to their executives.15
Most of the reported cases challenging the reasonableness of executive 
compensation decided prior to 1930 dealt with family or closely held corporations where 
the stockholders, executives, certain employees and their families are intertwined.  When 
one faction no longer allowed another faction to participate fully in the corporation's 
business, litigation followed.  The courts, noting the self-interest evident in such 
situations, generally reviewed the reasonableness of the compensation paid to the 
interested persons.  The theory was that compensation must be reasonably related to the 
value of the services obtained by the corporation.  If compensation were established by a 
board of directors composed of persons who were to receive the compensation or who 
had a personal interest therein, as was normally the case, then the court would not 
presume that the compensation established by the board was reasonable.  Accordingly, if 
a minority stockholder challenged the reasonableness of the payments, a factual 
determination as to reasonableness was required by the court.  However, where 
compensation was established by a board of directors composed of members who were 
disinterested therein and otherwise independent, the compensation was generally 
presumed to be reasonable.  Under such circumstances, the court would not generally 
substitute its judgment for that of the board of directors.  However, in a few cases, the 
minority stockholder challenging the reasonableness of compensation successfully 
14 Id. at 735.
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5alleged that the payment constituted a waste of corporate assets; that is a gift of corporate 
assets.  We will look to some of these cases to see how the doctrine of waste is applied.
As noted earlier, the seminal case addressing the doctrine of waste and the 
reasonableness of compensation paid by public corporations is Rogers v. Hill.  The suit 
was a derivative action brought by a minority stockholder seeking the recovery of 
allegedly excessive compensation paid to the management of The American Tobacco 
Company.16  The stockholders of The American Tobacco Company had approved a plan 
to pay an annual bonus to the president and five vice-presidents of the company in the 
amount of 10% of the annual profits of the company earned each year over and above the 
profits earned in the year 1910.17  After several years of payments, due to the success of 
the corporation, the amount of the bonuses became quite large with the largest single 
bonus paid amounting to $842,507 paid to the president in 1930.18
The Supreme Court stated in its opinion that while great weight should be given 
to the decision by the stockholders of The American Tobacco Company in approving the 
bonus plan (the plan was approved by a near unanimous vote), which the court said was 
presumably made in good faith and according to the stockholder's best judgment, this fact 
cannot justify the payment of salaries that are so large as to amount to spoliation or waste 
of corporate property.19  In that regard, the court quoted with approval the following 
statement made in a dissenting opinion issued by the Court of Appeals: “If a bonus 
payment has no relation to the value of services for which it is given, it is in reality a gift 
16
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6in part, and the majority stockholders have no power to give away corporate property 
against the protest of the minority.”20
The court held that the mere existence of the bonus plan and the payments made 
pursuant thereto did not, without proof of other facts, justify a determination of waste.21
However, because the amount of the payments had grown so large over the years, the 
court concluded that an evidentiary hearing should be held to determine whether the 
payments were reasonable.22  Accordingly, the case was sent back to the district court for 
a determination of the reasonableness of the payments made.23
So what should we conclude from this decision?  First, we should understand that 
the doctrine of waste was alive and applicable to the payment of compensation by public 
corporations in 1933.  Waste is a gift of corporate assets.  Neither the board of directors 
nor the majority of stockholders of a corporation has the right to give away corporate 
assets in the form of unreasonable compensation.  Waste can occur in two different 
manners.  One is the payment of compensation without any requirement for the 
performance of any services in return therefore.  The other is the payment of too much 
compensation in return for the services received or expected to be received.  Only the 
incremental amount in excess of the value of the services rendered is waste.  The 
Supreme Court indicated that no matter how large the compensation paid as compared to 
the services rendered or to be rendered, no per se case of waste could be made out.  
Waste must be established based upon a factual presentation.  Waste will not be 
20 Id. at 591-592.
21 Id. at 591.
22 Id. at 592.
23 Id. at 591-592.  
7presumed.  There must be some evidence as to the value of the services as compared to 
the value of the compensation paid.
The Supreme Court did not state in the opinion whether every plaintiff alleging 
waste by a publicly owned corporation is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing as to the 
reasonableness of compensation paid or whether only those who can meet some threshold 
test may proceed.  By allowing all claims of waste to proceed, the court would obviously 
invite excessive litigation.  On the other hand, by making the threshold too high, the court 
would be suppressing meritorious litigation.  This issue is still open for resolution today.
Soon thereafter, the New York Supreme Court addressed the issue of excessive 
compensation in Gallin v. National City Bank of New York.24  The court approved 
without comment a report of a referee.25  The case involved payments made under a 
management incentive plan established by National City Bank of New York in 1923.26
Under the plan 20% of the net profits of the company in excess of a specified amount, 
which represented an 8% return on capital invested by the stockholders, was to be paid 
annually to certain management executives.27 The remaining 80% of net profits was to be 
paid to the stockholders.28  The plan had been established by the board of directors 
without the approval of the stockholders, though the stockholders were made aware of the 
plan.29
In the decision, the referee reported that at no time did more than three of the 
company's eight directors have any opportunity to participate in the plan, and the 
24
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8disinterested directors who approved the plan represented major stockholders of the 
company.30  The referee said that since the major stockholders were disinterested, they 
obviously had no incentive to give away the corporation's assets to its management.31
The referee also noted that the disinterested directors of the company selected the persons 
who were entitled to participate in the plan.32  During the 6-year period that the plan was 
in effect, the capital surplus and undivided profits of the company increased 214% and 
the total net operating earnings of the company increased 185%, thereby causing the 
bonus payments to grow substantially in amount.33  Apparently, there was no evidence 
introduced at the trial to establish that the amount of the compensation paid was 
excessive, with the plaintiffs apparently assuming that the magnitude of the payments 
alone established waste per se.
The referee, as did the trial court, relied extensively upon the decision of Rogers 
v. Hill.34 Accordingly, the referee stated that the magnitude of the total compensation 
paid out by the company, in and of itself, did not establish waste or a breach of duty of 
the directors.35  The referee also held that the directors were not negligent in establishing 
the plan, having acted with full knowledge of all material facts and in what they believed 
to be the best interest of all the stockholders, including themselves.36
However, the referee introduced a new element with respect to the board of 
directors’ role in approving executive compensation.  The referee held that the directors 
breached their duty to the stockholders because payments made under the plan were 
30 Id. at 885, 281 N.Y.S. at 800.
31 Id., 281 N.Y.S. at 800.
32 Id. at 889, 281 N.Y.S. at 804.
33 Id. at 888-889, 281 N.Y.S. at 803-804.
34 Id. at 885 & 886, 281 N.Y.S. 800-801.
35 Id. at 887-888, 281 N.Y.S. 802-803.   
36 Id. at 891, 281 N.Y.S. at 806.
9calculated improperly by management and approved by the board of directors without 
having an independent review of management's calculations.37  Accordingly, the referee 
entered a judgment against the directors for over $1,800,000.38
In this regard, the referee stated the following:
The board of directors and executive committee of the company, to insure 
the proper computation of the management fund, should have intrusted 
that work to officers or employees in no manner interested in the 
management fund.  Failure so to do constituted a breach of their duty as 
directors and subjects them to liability for the restoration of moneys 
improperly paid through such erroneous computations of the management 
fund."39
This decision appears to be in full accord with the holding in Rogers v. Hill, while 
it introduces a new element with respect to the board of directors' responsibility in 
approving calculations of executive compensation to be paid out.
In 1939, the United States District Court in Delaware addressed the issue of 
excessive compensation in public corporations in the case of Koplar v. Warner Bros. 
Pictures, Inc.40 This was a derivative suit against the directors of Warner Bros. Pictures, 
Inc. for paying excessive compensation to the three Warner brothers.41   The 
compensation included the issuance to them of a large block of common stock in the 
company.42  In its opinion, the court described the history of the company from its 
infancy and the critical contribution of the three Warner brothers to its success.43  The 
court also mentioned the extensive publicity given to the large amount of compensation 
37 Id. at 893, 281 N.Y.S. at 808.
38 Id. at 903, 281 N.Y.S. at 819.
39 Id. at 893, 281 N.Y.S. at 808.
40 19 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1939).
41 Id. at 174.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 175-176.
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paid by the company to the Warner brothers as a result of a United States Senate 
investigation in 1932.44
In discussing its decision, the court mentioned that during the years 1929 through 
1931 not a single stockholder voted against the re-election of the company slate of 
directors, which included the three Warner brothers, and not a single stockholder 
complained of the employment contract between the Warner brothers and the company 
during the period it was making a profit.45  The court noted that in 1929, the company 
made over $17,000,000, and for the first six months of fiscal 1930, the company made 
over $10,000,000.46  Thereafter, during the heart of the depression, the company began to 
lose money.47
The court held that under the circumstances, the compensation paid to the Warner 
brothers, including the payment of $10,000 per week and the grant of 90,000 shares of 
common stock (allegedly worth $10,000,00048), did not constitute a waste of corporate 
assets.49  While the court inferred that compensation paid in the amounts shown may be 
immoral, it is legally defensible.50  The court stated: 
Salaries of $10,000 a week are matched by salaries paid other top 
executives in this business.  As a matter of morals such payments may be 
questioned.  Directors have the power to award just compensation. That 
power should be used, not abused.  Fair human requirements should set 
some limits to salaries.  Extraordinary talent is not acquired.  If it were, it 
would not be extraordinary.  Doubtless it is an endowment, which the 
holder should not place on the auction block.51




48 Id. at 184.




The district court in this case clearly followed the principles handed down in 
Rogers v. Hill and Galin v. National City Bank of New York.
In 1941, the New York Supreme Court decided the case of Heller v. Boylan.52
This case involved a continuation of the dispute that was the subject of Rogers v. Hill.  
Here the plaintiff challenged the payment of bonuses to the executives of The American 
Tobacco Company for the years since 1921.53  During that period, bonuses were paid 
aggregating more than $10,000,000 in addition to substantial salaries.54  The trial judge 
held that these payments were per se unreasonable.55  The New York Supreme Court 
cited Rogers v. Hill and Gallin v. National City Bank of New York favorably as 
precedents throughout its opinion.  The court noted that the amounts paid may seem 
immoral and an indictment of our economic system to some jurists.56  It noted that some 
economists have advocated a ceiling on compensation.57  But the court upheld the 
principles established in Rogers v. Hill.  It concluded that the payment of compensation 
couldn't be held excessive per se due to its apparent unreasonableness to the trial court.58
It concluded that a factual hearing was required in order to make such a determination.59
The court then raised some problems that it believed would necessarily arise in 
any such factual determination by the trial court.  It asked rhetorically whose 
compensation should be compared with the executives' compensation, those of persons in 
the same industry, those of persons in other industries or possibly that of the president of 
52
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the United States.60  It concluded this dialogue with the following statement:  “Courts are 
ill-equipped to solve or even to grapple with these entangled economic problems.”61
While the court ruled in favor of the defendants, it emphasized the fact that it was 
not holding that the payments made were reasonable but only stating that it "cannot by 
any reliable standard" find them to be waste.62  No expert testimony had been provided as 
to this issue at the trial level.  However, as did the court in Galin v. National City Bank of 
New York, the court in a rather lengthy analysis reviewed extensively the computations 
made by the company as to the amount of the bonuses to be paid under the formula 
approved by the stockholders.63
In 1942, the New York Supreme Court had another occasion to revisit the issue of 
excessive compensation paid at a publicly owned corporation in the case of Diamond v. 
Davis.64  Here a minority stockholder sued the United States Rubber Company for 
granting a substantial stock option to its president and Chairman of the Board.65  The suit 
arose after the president exercised a portion of a stock option granted to him by the 
company, with the plaintiff alleging that the option profit constituted a gift of $150,000 to 
him.66  E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. was also made a defendant because it owned 
approximately 19% of the stock of United States Rubber Company and its representative 
on the board of directors had voted in favor of the stock option plan.67  Virtually all of the 
stockholders of the company had approved the plan.68
60 Id. at 679.
61 Id. at 680.
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 575-680
64
 38 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942).
65 Id. at 107-108.
66 Id. at 108.
67 Id. at 108 and 122-123.  
68 Id. at 110.
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In upholding the grant of the stock option, the court stated that where most of the 
stockholders of a company approve a compensation plan, "it is most convincing proof not 
only of the absence of fraud but also that benefits honestly and reasonably flow from the 
practice."69  It noted that five of the eight directors who voted for the plan were not 
officers or beneficiaries of the company's incentive compensation plan and that the 
president did not vote on the matter.70  The New York Supreme Court in this decision 
continued to follow its earlier precedents of Gallin v. National City Bank of New York 
and Heller v. Boylan.
In 1942, a federal District Court in New York rendered a decision in the case of 
Winkelman v. General Motors Corp.71 This case involved a stockholder derivative action 
challenging compensation paid by General Motors under a bonus plan adopted in 1918 
and amended from time to time thereafter.72  The plan essentially provided for the 
payment of bonuses to executives of the company aggregating 10% on the company's net 
income above an amount determined to be 6% (later increased to 7%) of capital 
employed.73  The plan was terminated at the end of 1936.74  The participants varied in 
number over the years with the minimum and maximum participation being 679 and 
2889 persons, respectively, from 1923 through 1935.75
The court noted that the corporation was very successful during many of the years 
covered by the plan.76  For instance, during the years 1922 through 1929, assets of the 
corporation increased by 140%, sales by 225%, net income by 355% and return on capital 
69 Id. at 114.
70 Id. at 114.
71
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72 Id. at 965 and 969.  
73 Id. at 965.
74 Id. at 968.
75 Id. at 966
76 Id. at 970.
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averaged 29.45%.77  The court held that the New York statute of limitations precluded 
any review of amounts paid before 1930, though it expressed its opinion that some of the 
amounts paid were sufficiently large as to constitute waste.78  The court stated that certain 
payments thereafter were sufficiently large so as to require a factual hearing as to their 
reasonableness under the authority of Rogers.79  However, the court then went on to 
conclude from the review that the payments were not excessive since the services 
rendered were equal in value to the amounts paid under the plan.80  As did the courts in 
Galin v. National City Bank of New York and Heller v. Boylan, this court determined that 
there were problems with some of the calculations made under the bonus plan and that 
some of the payments made thereunder were not properly approved or were approved 
without a full disclosure of the facts.81
These are the principal early decisions cited by courts throughout the United 
States when confronted with the issue of excessive executive compensation.  Another 
decision that is rarely referenced in unreasonable compensation cases but that is 
instructive in any review of the older precedents is McQuillen v. National Cash Register 
Co.82 The United States District Court of Maryland had occasion to determine whether a 
stock option given by the board of directors of National Cash Register Co. to its chairman 
in return for services to be rendered constituted excessive compensation and a waste of 
corporate assets.83  At the time, National Cash Register was the largest manufacturer of 
77 Id.
78 Id. at 967.
79 Id. at 969.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 970.
82
 27 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939)
83 Id. at 641.
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cash registers and accounting machines in the world.84  The court reported that the 
earnings of the company had increased gradually from 1925 through 1929, decreased 
gradually from 1929 through 1931, resulted in a net loss in 1932 and 1933, and returned 
to profitability each year from 1934 through 1937.85
The court dismissed the lawsuit as being without merit.86  In its opinion, the court 
made some rather prophetic statements concerning the ability of courts to litigate the 
reasonableness of executive compensation.  The court quoted with approval the following 
language from the very early case of Wight v. Heublein,87 a case involving a dispute 
between two families, one which owned 2/3rds of the stock of a corporation and the other, 
which owned 1/3rd of the stock:88
It is obviously not the province of a court of equity to act as the general 
manager of a corporation or to assume the regulation of its internal affairs.  
If the chosen directors, without interests in conflict with the interest of 
stockholders, act in good faith in fixing salaries or incurring other 
expenses, their judgment will not ordinarily be reviewed by the courts, 
however unwise or mistaken it may appear; but this is far from saying that 
equity will refuse to redress the wrong done to a stockholder by the action 
or policy of directors, whether in voting themselves excessive salaries or 
otherwise, which operates to their own personal advantage, without any 
corresponding benefit to the corporation under their control.89
Thereafter the court went on to explain further what it intended by its approval of 
the above quote from Wight v. Heublein.  It stated:
An issue as to the reasonable value of the services of officers is easily 
made.  It is not intended that courts shall be called upon to make a yearly 
audit and adjust salaries.90 .  .  . 
We must distinguish between compensation that is actually wasteful and 
that which is merely excessive.  The former is unlawful, the latter is not.  
84 Id. at 652.
85 Id. at 654.
86 Id. at 655.
87
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The former is the result of a failure to relate the amount of compensation 
to the needs of the particular situation by any recognized business 
practices, honestly, even though unwisely adopted, -- namely, the result of 
bad faith, or a total neglect of or indifference to such practices.  Excessive 
compensation results from poor judgment, not necessarily from anything 
else.91
This court for the first time articulated a difference between excessive 
compensation and wasteful compensation.  But no clear test or standard is provided for 
making such a determination.  The court focused upon the process by which the 
compensation was approved and the good faith of the directors (the business judgment 
rule).  The court references the use of recognized business practices by the board of 
directors in establishing compensation as compared to a total neglect of or indifference to 
such practices.  This idea of tying waste exclusively to a failure to follow recognized 
business practices due to bad faith, total neglect or indifference appears contrary to the 
opinions expressed in the other leading cases.  The court implies that a gift of corporate 
property is not waste if there is no bad faith or total neglect or indifference to recognized 
business practices.  As the U. S. Supreme Court stated in Rogers v. Hill, if a bonus has no 
relationship to the value of the services rendered, it is a gift and cannot be approved by 
the board of directors or a majority of the stockholders, even where their actions are made 
in good faith.  While it appears that the District Court had no intention of reversing 
Rogers v. Hill, its statements appear in conflict with the earlier decision.
Following the spurt of litigation that occurred immediately after the depression, 
litigation concerning excessive compensation at public corporations seems to have 
subsided.  This may be due to the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
which in part required that extensive information concerning executive compensation of 
91 Id. at 653.
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the highest paid executives of a publicly owned corporation had to be disclosed in proxy 
solicitation materials.92 Litigation continued concerning the payment of unreasonable 
compensation by closely held corporations, and the courts in these cases frequently cited 
Rogers v. Hill and its progeny as applicable precedent for their rulings.
All of the earlier cases, except McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co. are 
consistent in holding that the payment of compensation so large as to have no reasonable 
relationship to the value of the services rendered or to be rendered constitutes waste, and 
waste may not be approved by the stockholders or the board of directors of a corporation 
over the objections of a minority stockholder.  Furthermore, they uniformly establish that 
no matter how large the compensation may appear to the court, it is not waste per se.  
Waste can only be established through an evidentiary hearing.  These courts do not state 
how the court can determine on the basis of the allegations of the complaint alone when 
an evidentiary hearing should be allowed and when the complaint should be summarily 
dismissed.  This failure will become more glaring upon a review of the recent Delaware 
cases concerning unreasonable executive compensation.
III. A Review and Analysis of the Earlier Delaware Cases.
In 1952, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical 
Corp.93 There the plaintiff sued the corporation to have certain stock options issued under 
a plan by the defendant corporation cancelled and to enjoin any further issuance of stock 
options under the plan.94  The Chancery Court in Delaware entered judgment for the 
92 See supra n. 13.  
93
 33 Del.Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952).  
94 Id. at 82, 90 A.2d at 660.
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defendant.95  The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed and sent the case back to the 
lower court for a full evidentiary hearing.96
The Supreme Court clearly understood Rogers v. Hill to establish that 
compensation paid by a corporation to the extent it is excessive constitutes a gift of 
corporate property and is improper.97  The court, citing Rogers v. Hill, stated the 
following: “Certainly gifts to themselves or to their business associates will not avail 
against the vote of any qualified objector.  Since a gift may be a gift in part only, a totally 
inadequate consideration, of course, invokes the same principle as the absence of any at 
all.”98
The Delaware Supreme Court decided Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc.
99
 the same day it decided Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.  There the plaintiff sued 
the corporation to enjoin the issuance of stock under a stock option plan and the payment 
of bonuses under a profit sharing plan.100  Though five of the eight directors were 
beneficiaries under the plans, the stockholders of the corporation approved the plans.101
The court again stated that majority stockholders couldn’t ratify or approve a gift of 
corporate property over the objection of any stockholder.102  The court said that it was not 
called upon to decide whether there was a reasonable relationship between the benefits to 
be received by the corporation and the amount of compensation to be paid to the 
employees under the stock option plan because the stock option plan was deficient as a 
95 Id. at 87, 90 A.2d at 663.
96 Id. at 95, 90 A.2d at 668.
97 Id. at 91, 90 A.2d at 665.
98 Id., 90 A.2d at 665. 
99
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100 Id. at 71, 90 A.2d at 654.
101 Id. at 73, 90 A.2d at 655.
102 Id. at 73-74, 90 A.2d at 655.
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matter of law.103  The court held that there was no consideration to be received by the 
corporation under the stock option plan since the options granted thereunder could be 
exercised immediately by the employees even if they terminated their employment 
immediately.104  The court, citing Rogers v. Hill, held that there was insufficient evidence 
before it to allow a determination of whether the profit sharing plan was wasteful.105 In 
that regard, the court said:
With respect to the objection of the plaintiffs that the value of the 
services bears no reasonable relationship to the amounts to be paid under 
the plan, we cannot say, looking at the scheme of the profit-sharing plan 
and the amounts to be paid under it on the basis of past and anticipated 
earnings, that those amounts are so large as, in effect, to amount to 
spoliation or waste of the corporate assets.  In view of the present earnings 
of the corporation, the amounts to be paid under the plan do not seem 
shockingly large.  There is nothing in the record before us to demonstrate 
the persons to whom the amounts will be paid will not render services 
bearing a reasonable relation to those amounts.106
This decision and the Gottlieb decision are clearly decided in accordance with the 
principles setout in Rogers v. Hill and its progeny to the effect that (1) stockholders and 
directors may not under any circumstances approve compensation that amounts to waste, 
(2) compensation paid by a corporation in excess of the fair value of the services received 
or to be received by it in the future constitutes waste, and (3) there is no presumption of 
waste even though the magnitude of the compensation paid or to be paid may appear 
shocking to the court.
The Delaware Supreme Court also clearly stated that a gift of corporate property 
is improper even where the board of directors acts honestly believing that the transaction 
is in the best interest of the corporation.  In that regard it said:
103 Id at 75, 90 A.2d at 656.
104 Id. at 77, 90 A.2d at 657.
105 Id. at 78, 90 A.2d at 658.
106 Id., 90 A.2d at 658.
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Honest directors conceivably might give away to their associates in the 
enterprise substantial amounts of a corporation’s property in the belief that 
the gift would produce such gratitude that ultimately the corporation’s 
generosity would be more than repaid.  There would be nothing immoral 
or dishonest about such an action, but it would not be legally sound.107
In 1979, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Michelson v. Duncan.108  There a 
stockholder of Household Finance Corporation sued to set aside stock options granted to 
key employees pursuant to a company stock option plan.109  The stock option plan 
originally allowed for the exercise of the options over a 9-year period but was later 
amended to reduce the period to 4 years.110  In 1974, following a dramatic decline in the 
market price of the corporations stock, the board of directors cancelled previous options 
issued and replaced them with new options at a lower price.111  This was done in order to 
restore some incentive for the employees.112  The exercise price of the new options was 
between $7 and $18 below the exercise price of the old options.113
The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed by the trial court on a motion for summary 
judgment for failure to plead facts that constituted waste.114  The Delaware Supreme 
Court reversed the dismissal and returned the case for trial.115  In its decision, the court 
described the doctrine of waste in the following manner:
The essence of a claim of gift is lack of consideration.  The essence of a 
claim of waste of corporate assets is the diversion of corporate assets for
improper or unnecessary purposes.  Although directors are given wide 
latitude in making business judgments, they are bound to act out of fidelity 
and honesty in their roles as fiduciaries.  (Citations omitted)  And they 
may not, simply because of their position, ‘by way of excessive salaries 
107 Gottlieb, 33 Del. Ch. at 88, 90 A.2d at 663-664.  
108 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979).  
109 Id. at 214.




114 Id. at 214.
115 Id.
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and other devices, oust the minority of a fair return upon its investment.’  
(Citation omitted)  It is common sense that a transfer for no consideration 
amounts to a gift or waste of corporate assets.116
The court here mixes two distinct concepts.  One is the doctrine of waste and the 
other is the doctrine of breach of fiduciary duty (“fidelity and honesty”).  Clearly, an 
honest board of directors acting in good faith may commit waste by authorizing the 
payment of money for which the corporation receives no equivalent benefit.  That is what 
happened in Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc.  However, the above quoted 
statement does not make this principle of law clear.
In its opinion, the court also confirmed the principle that waste may not be 
approved by a majority of the stockholders over the objection of a minority 
stockholder.117  It said that while stockholders may ratify the actions of the officers and 
directors that are beyond their authority, they may not confirm waste: “It is only where a 
claim of gift or waste of assets, fraud or Ultra vires is asserted that a less than unanimous 
shareholder ratification is not a full defense.”118
While the court stated that an allegation of waste is seldom dismissed on a motion 
for summary judgment, it referenced Section 157 of the Delaware Corporate Law relating 
to the issuance of rights to purchase stock of a corporation.119  The court states that the 
statute provides as follows: “In the absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the 
judgment of the directors as to the consideration for the issuance of such rights or options 
and the sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive.”120
116 Id. at 217.
117 Id. at 218-219.
118 Id. at 219.
119 Id. at 223-224.
120 Id.
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The court noted that the statute was not applicable since implicit in the statute is 
the fact that some consideration has been given in return for the issuance of the rights or 
options referenced, while in the present case the plaintiff has alleged that there was no 
consideration given in return for the options issued.121  The court specifically reserved for
a later date the issue of whether Section 157 disposes of an inadequacy of consideration 
claim.122  This statute may very well dispose of all inadequacy of consideration claims 
relating to the issuance of stock options or related rights in Delaware but it does not do so 
with respect to claims of waste relating to other forms of compensation.
IV. A Review and Analysis of the Later Delaware Cases.
In 1984, the Delaware Supreme Court decided the case of Aronson v. Lewis.123
This was a derivative lawsuit by a stockholder against the corporation and the board of 
directors challenging an employment agreement between the corporation and Leo Fink, 
one of its directors and its principle stockholder.124  Mr. Fink owned 47% of the 
corporation’s stock.125  The plaintiff sought a cancellation of the employment contract 
and the recovery of damages from the directors including Mr. Fink.126
The Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for failure of the plaintiff 
to make demand on the corporation for it to pursue the claim before filing suit as required 
by Chancery Rule 23.1.127  The court noted that no facts were alleged to show that a 
121 Id. at 224.
122 Id.
123 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1983).  
124 Id. at 809.
125 Id. at 808.
126 Id. at 809.
127 Id. at 818.  According to the decision, Chancery Rule 23.1 provided in pertinent part the following:
“In a derivative action brought by 1 or more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or 
of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may 
properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall allege that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the 
time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share of membership thereafter devolved on him 
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majority of the members of the board of directors breached their fiduciary duty or lacked 
sufficient independence to evaluate the claim, which is necessary in Delaware in order to 
waive the requirement of Chancery Rule 23.1 to make demand on the corporation to 
bring suit.128
The decision is confusing for several reasons.  It is not made clear in the context 
of a waste allegation why demand on the corporation is required.  Previous decisions 
have clearly held that waste cannot be approved by directors or stockholders, so any 
decision by the board of directors not to pursue a legitimate waste claim would be 
invalid.  It seems that the corporation’s decision is solely whether to take charge of the 
litigation or leave it to the stockholder to pursue in a derivative claim.129  The court also 
concluded that there was an insufficient allegation of facts in the complaint to show 
waste.  In that regard the court said:
In essence, the plaintiff alleged a lack of consideration flowing 
from Fink to Meyers, since the employment agreement provided that 
compensation was not contingent on Fink’s ability to perform any 
services.  The bare assertion that Fink performed ‘little or no services’ was 
plaintiff’s conclusion based solely on Fink’s age and the existence of the 
Fink-Prudential employment agreement.130
The court fails to make clear why the complaint is inadequate.  What more is 
there to say other than that someone is being paid for the performance of “little or no 
services.”  It will require evidence to establish whether the services performed, if any, or 
to be performed in the future are of equal value to the payments being made. 
by operation of law.  The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the 
plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for his 
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.”  See n. 1 at 808.
128 Id.
129
 Previous decisions have held that whether waste has in fact occurred can only be determined by the 
court following an evidentiary hearing.  It cannot be generally determined per se.
130 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 817.    
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In Grobow v. Perot,131 a stockholder of General Motors Corporation alleged the 
waste of corporate assets in connection with the repurchase of a certain class of shares of 
stock from H. Ross Perot.132  Again, the Delaware Supreme Court dismissed a complaint 
for failure of the plaintiff to make demand on the corporation to pursue the claim as 
required by Chancery Rule 23.1.133  In its opinion, the court focused at length upon the 
requirements necessary for a pleading in order to obtain a waiver of the demand 
requirement of Chancery Rule 23.1.134  The court says that the complaint must state facts 
establishing a reasonable doubt as to whether the directors are entitled to the protection of 
the business judgment rule or are acting independently.135  The court characterizes the 
allegations of the complaint as follows: “[P]laintiffs allege that the premium paid Perot 
constituted a prima facie waste of GM’s assets.  Plaintiffs argue that the transaction, on 
its face, was ‘so egregious as to be afforded no presumption of business judgment 
protection.’”136
But the court responds to the plaintiff’s allegations as follows: “[P]laintiffs have 
failed to plead with particularity facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that the 
substantive terms of the repurchase fall within the protection of the business judgment 
rule.”137
Accordingly, the court concluded with the following statement:
We hold that the complaints as amended fail to allege facts sufficient to 
create a reasonable doubt that the GM Board-approved repurchase 
transaction is not within the protection of the business judgment rule; thus, 
131 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988).  
132 Id. at 183-185
133 Id. at 180.
134 Id. 
135 Id.
136 Id at 189.
137 Id at 190.
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the plaintiffs have failed to establish the futility of demand required under 
Aronson and Pogostin for casting reasonable doubt thereon.138
Once again, we are left without any clear understanding as to whether the 
Delaware Supreme Court is changing the rules previously thought to apply to actions 
alleging waste.  The board of directors cannot approve waste, and their decision not to 
pursue a legitimate claim of waste cannot therefore be allowed to stand.  The board’s 
decision is not whether the claim should be pursued but whether they want to pursue it or 
allow it to be pursued by others.
In Brehm v. Eisner,139 the Delaware Supreme Court again addressed an allegation 
of corporate waste.  The case involved a challenge to compensation paid to Michael 
Ovitz by The Walt Disney Company upon his termination from employment.140  He was 
hired pursuant to a 5-year contract to be the successor to Michael Eisner, the Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer of the corporation.141  The contract, dated October 1, 1995, 
provided for a salary of $1,000,000 annually, the payment of a bonus at the discretion of 
the board of directors, and the issuance of certain stock options.142  It further provided 
that upon termination without cause, Mr. Ovitz is to receive the present value of the 
remaining salary to be paid under his contract plus $10,000,000, an additional $7,500,000 
for each year remaining under the contract and the right to exercise options for 3,000,000 
shares of common stock of Disney.143  The board of directors terminated Mr. Ovitz 
without cause effective December 27, 1996.144  According to the agreement of 
138 Id at 192.
139 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).  
140 Id. at 248.
141 Id. at 249-250.
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 250 and 252-253.
144 Id. at 252.
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termination approved by the board of directors, Mr. Ovitz was to be paid $38,888,230.77 
and allowed to exercise stock options worth approximately $101,000,000.145
Various stockholders sued the 1995 board of directors of Disney alleging a breach 
of the duty of care required of directors due to their approval of the contract of 
employment with Ovitz and for waste.146  They also sued the 1996 board of directors of 
Disney alleging a breach of duty of care for agreeing to a termination of Ovitz without 
cause and for waste.147  The Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for failure 
of the plaintiffs to make demand upon the corporation to bring suit as required by 
Chancery Rule 23.1.148
In its opinion, the court early on states that: “On the one hand, it appears from the 
Complaint that: (a) the compensation and termination payout for Ovitz were exceedingly 
lucrative, if not luxurious, compared to Ovitz’ value to the Company; . . .. ”149
But then the court states that: “On the other hand, the Complaint is so inartfully 
drafted that it was properly dismissed under our pleading standards for derivative 
suits.”150
Thereafter the court turns its attention to the failure of the plaintiff to make a pre-
suit demand, as it did in Aronson v. Lewis and Grobow v. Perot.  The court says:
Moreover, the sheer size of the payout to Ovitz, as alleged, pushes the 
envelope of judicial respect for the business judgment of directors in 
making compensation decisions.  Therefore, both as to the processes of the 
two Boards and the waste test, this is a close case.
But our concerns about lavish executive compensation and our 
institutional aspirations that boards of directors of Delaware corporations 
145 Id. at 252-253.
146 Id. at 248-249 and 251-253.
147 Id. at 248-249 and 253.
148 Id. at 262 and 267.
149 Id. at 249.
150 Id. at 249.
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live up to the highest standards of good corporate practices do not 
translate into a holding that these plaintiffs have set forth particularized 
facts excusing a pre-suit demand under our law and our pleading 
requirements.151
Later in the opinion, the court summarizes what it concludes the suit is about as 
follows: “This is a case about whether there should be personal liability of the directors 
of a Delaware corporation to the corporation for lack of due care in the decisionmaking 
process and for waste of corporate assets.”152
The court then states its conclusion as follows: “But the Complaint fails on its 
face to meet the waste test because it does not allege with particularity facts tending to 
show that no reasonable business person would have made the decision that the New 
Board made under these circumstances.”153
In its opinion, the court provides us with the most comprehensive statement yet as 
to what it believes is necessary to establish waste.
The judicial standard for determination of corporate waste is well 
developed.  Roughly, a waste entails an exchange of corporate assets for 
consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at 
which any reasonable person might be willing to trade.  Most often the
claim is associated with a transfer of corporate assets that serves no 
corporate purpose; or for which no consideration at all is received.  Such a 
transfer is in effect a gift. If, however, there is any substantial
consideration received by the corporation, and if there is a good faith 
judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, there 
should be no finding of waste, even if the fact finder would conclude ex 
post that the transaction was unreasonably risky.154
V. The Current Confusion in the Delaware Supreme Court.
The Delaware Supreme Court has mixed and confused several distinct issues of 
law involved in their decisions in Aronson v. Lewis, Grobow v. Perot and Brehm v. 
151 Id. at 249.
152 Id. at 255.
153 Id. at 266.
154 Id. at 263.
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Eisner.  This confusion, unless carefully untangled, will have the effect of erasing the 
long-standing doctrine of waste.  One commentator apparently believes these decisions 
have already had this effect.155
Let us look at application of the demand requirement under corporate law 
(Chancery Rule 23.1 in Delaware) and its relationship to the doctrine of waste.  Then we 
will look at the application of the business judgment rule to the liability of directors and 
its relationship to the doctrine of waste.
In Aronson v. Lewis and Grobow v. Perot, the Delaware Supreme Court premised 
dismissal of the complaint upon the failure of the plaintiff to make demand upon the 
corporation as required under Chancery Rule 23.1. Failure to comply with Chancery 
Rule 23.1 also appears to have been a factor in Brehm v. Eisner; however, in reaching its 
decision the court also focused heavily upon the inartful drafting of the complaint and the 
issue of whether the directors can be held liable for waste without allegations establishing 
a violation of the business judgment rule.
The rule requiring that first demand be made on a corporation before proceeding 
with a derivative action is typical of most corporation law statutes.  The purpose of the 
rule is to allow the directors, who are charged by the stockholders with the responsibility 
for managing the corporation, to determine whether it is in the best interest of the 
corporation to proceed with the lawsuit.  Demand is excused under the rule where the 
directors cannot make a good faith determination due to a lack of independence or where 
the directors fail to comply with the business judgment rule in arriving at their decision.
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 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in
Futility, 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 569, 578 (2001).  The author states that if corporations use compensation 
committees composed of independent directors, which most do, they may be effectively immune from 
judicial review.
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The demand requirement allows the board of directors to determine whether the 
stockholder’s complaint should be pursued by the corporation, depending upon what is in 
the best interest of the corporation.  If the stockholder has prematurely filed the derivative 
action and the board of directors decides to continue the litigation, it may simply ask the 
court for permission to take charge of the prosecution of the case and be substituted as the 
plaintiff.  If it believes the case should be dismissed, it would ask the court to dismiss the 
lawsuit, it being in the best interest of the corporation to do so.  However, when an 
allegation of waste has been made, the court is not in a position to dismiss the case, even 
if the board of directors believes that it is in the best interest of the corporation to do so, 
unless the court determines factually that no waste has occurred.
For instance, assume that the court makes no determination as to whether waste 
has occurred.  Then there exist two possibilities, one that waste has occurred and the 
other that waste has not occurred.  If the court dismisses the lawsuit and waste has 
occurred, the basis for the dismissal is that no demand was made on the corporation and 
the board of directors may have concluded that the lawsuit was not in the best interest of 
the corporation.  The problem with this result is that it constitutes a reversal of the long-
standing principle that the board of directors cannot sanction waste adopted by every 
court that has dealt with waste.  Therefore, the court must determine factually whether 
waste has occurred before it can allow a dismissal of the suit for failure to make a 
demand on the corporation or effectively revoke this long standing rule relating to waste.
The court, in Brehm v. Eisner, touched upon another possibility when it stated that 
the complaint is so inartfully drafted that it may fail to allege a case of waste.  This raises 
the issue of whether a complaint should ever be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to 
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allege facts constituting waste.  Under the historical precedents, there has been no test 
adopted for determining when an allegation of waste should be dismissed summarily, and 
the Delaware Supreme Court has not explicitly proposed any such test.  Under all of the 
historic precedents, waste can only be determined following an evidentiary hearing.  So 
for summary judgment purposes, waste has historically been presumed.  However, in 
none of these cases were the allegations trivial in nature.  All of the cases involved 
payments of compensation bordering on the extreme.  But that is also true in Brehm v. 
Eisner.  To simply dismiss the complaint as a matter of law on the basis that the amount 
of compensation paid was not waste without the application of any objective test nor any 
factual hearing, would violate all of the earlier precedents precluding summary judgment 
where waste is alleged.
Now, let us look at the application of the business judgment rule as it applies to an 
allegation of waste.  If the directors of a corporation commit waste, they may be liable for 
their actions.  Generally, independent directors of a corporation are provided the 
protection of the business judgment rule with respect to their decisions.  That rule shields 
directors from liability if they act in good faith in what they reasonably believe to be in 
the best interest of the corporation, and they have considered in their deliberations all 
material facts reasonably available to them in making their decisions.156  The test is 
focused upon their good faith and the process employed by them in arriving at their 
decisions.157  The quality of the directors’ decisions is not at issue.  As the court stated in 
Brehm v. Eisner:
156
 The business judgment rule is discussed in Aronson, 473 A2d at 812.
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 The directors may also be protected by provisions in the corporation’s Articles of Incorporations or 
bylaws eliminating liability or by express provisions in contracts with the directors.
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It is the essence of the business judgment rule that a court will not apply 
20/20 hindsight to second guess a board’s decision, except ‘in rare cases 
[where] a transaction may be so egregious on its face that the board 
approval cannot meet the test of business judgment’.158
A similar analysis would be made under the Model Business Corporation Act.  
Section 8.31 of the 1984 draft of the Act provides that independent directors are not liable 
except where they fail to act in good faith or in what they believe to be the best interest of 
the corporation, fail to be reasonably informed about the matters to be considered or 
devote appropriate attention to the matters to be considered.  Most states have adopted 
some form of the Act or have used it as a template for their statutes relating to 
corporations.  Therefore, most states would probably recognize the precedents adopted in 
Delaware with respect to director liability.  However, application of the business 
judgment rule to defeat a claim against the directors of a corporation should not 
necessarily result in a complete disposition of a case alleging waste.  Even where the 
directors are shielded from liability for waste, a lawsuit alleging waste should not be 
dismissed unless director liability is the sole issue involved.  For instance, a stockholder 
of a corporation may be entitled to an injunction or other relief precluding the corporation 
from committing waste or continuing to do so.159  A stockholder may also seek on behalf 
of the corporation a recovery of waste from the recipient thereof since waste is a gift, a 
payment for which no consideration has been received by the corporation. 
Let us assume that the directors of a public corporation have no personal liability 
for a compensation decision because they are shielded by the business judgment rule.  A 
plaintiff alleging waste with respect to an employment contract between an officer and 
158 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 260.
159
 Note that the stockholder in Gottlieb v. Hayden Chemical Corp. sued for an injunction, and the 
stockholder in Aronson v. Lewis sued for a cancellation of the employment contract.
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the corporation is still entitled to seek relief on behalf of the corporation such as a 
rescission of the employment contract, an injunction against the corporation and its 
officers and directors from honoring the contract and/or the recovery of payments to the 
officer constituting waste.  For instance, in Brehm v. Eisner, Michael Ovitz, the employee 
who was to receive the compensation, and The Walt Disney Company were defendants in 
addition to the individual directors.  As the earlier cases clearly stated, neither the 
directors nor the majority stockholders may sanction waste, so even if no case for liability 
can be made out against the directors under the business judgment rule, the plaintiffs 
should have been allowed to proceed against the other parties seeking alternative forms 
of relief.
The Delaware Supreme Court also seems to confuse the element of good faith 
judgment of the board of directors, which may protect the directors under the business 
judgment rule, with a determination of waste.  While a good faith determination may be 
strong evidence that the compensation paid is not waste, it is not conclusive.  In many of 
the earlier precedents reviewed, the boards of directors were acting in good faith but the 
resulting disposition of the claim of waste was not determined on that fact alone.  The 
board of directors may have had incomplete or inaccurate information at the time of its 
deliberations, have made a poor business decision, or simply made a mistake in 
understanding the terms of the compensation arrangement.  While the board of directors 
may have no liability for their actions due to the protection of the business judgment rule, 
the compensation arrangement may still constitute waste, which would entitle the 
complaining stockholder to some form of remedy other than recovery of damages from 
the directors.
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It appears that the Delaware Supreme Court is wrestling with the same issue 
recognized by the district judge in McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co.160 There the 
court attempted to distinguish between “wasteful” and “excessive” compensation, one 
being unlawful and the other not so.161  The district judge in McQuillen essentially says 
that waste results solely from bad faith or the total neglect of or indifference to 
recognized business practices.162  The Delaware Supreme Court may be saying the same 
thing as the district judge in McQuillen, that where the board of directors satisfies the 
business judgment rule, there can be no waste.  However, this would be a complete 
departure from all of the earlier precedents involving waste, both in Delaware and 
elsewhere.  
VI. Conclusion.
In conclusion, the Delaware Supreme Court has failed to apply the traditional 
doctrine of waste in its most recent decisions.  The court has treated these cases alleging 
waste as ordinary derivative lawsuits involving allegations of director misconduct, 
dismissing them for failure to make demand or for failure to allege facts showing that the 
business judgment rule has been violated.  However, traditional waste cases are unique 
and cannot be dismissed in this manner without destroying the traditional concept of 
waste. 
Under the long-standing doctrine of waste, waste cannot be sanctioned by the 
board of directors or by the stockholders of a corporation over the objection of any 
stockholder.  Furthermore, there is no threshold test to be applied to determine if a 
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complaint should be dismissed on summary judgment nor is there any per se test to apply 
to establish waste as a matter of law.  An evidentiary hearing is always required.  If the 
Delaware Supreme Court desires to change these long standing precedents, it should do 
so explicitly.
Naturally the question arises concerning what the court should do to untangle 
these issues while maintaining a careful balance between the rights of stockholders and 
the duties and responsibilities of directors.  This issue will be addressed in a subsequent 
article to be published soon.
